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Dylan Richardson's avatar

This line of thought can be extended even further, in interesting ways. Of people who do vote, many (maybe most) don't vote for the sake of the general good, but rather (at least in part) for egoistic reasons. But since good-doing motivations far outweigh egoistic ones, this isn't merely selfish, it's irrational.

I wrote a post arguing that last year: https://open.substack.com/pub/dylanrichardson/p/why-not-vote-on-principle?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=rj6jj

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Nicholas Smyth's avatar

Zach is indeed awesome! But if this is really the whole argument, I have to disagree...

I'm sure this has been discussed ad nauseum in decision theory, but can it really make sense to say that a decision of mine has an "expected difference" when the only way that it will actually *make* any difference at all is if I am that insanely lucky swing voter? The reasoning is a fun little toy that we theorists can use to talk about this abstraction "expected difference", but it bears an extremely tenuous relation to actual decision-making.

The reductios are easy to generate: someone will, soon enough, cure cancer and save 50 billion future lives. Given my social position and location in history, suppose I have a 1 in 1 billion chance of fathering the child that becomes that heroic scientist. It would be absurd to approach the question of whether or not to have a child by telling myself that in doing so I can expect to save 50 lives. I should expect to save no lives. I should expect the state of cancer research to proceed precisely as it would have if I had never had any child. Right? And so the same expectations ought to guide my voting behaviour.

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